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Abstract—Sonification systems, in which data are represented
through sound, have the potential to be useful in a number of
network-security monitoring applications in Security Operations
Centres (SOCs). Security analysts working in SOCs generally
monitor networks using a combination of anomaly-detection
techniques, Intrusion Detection Systems and data presented in
visual and text-based forms. In the last two decades significant
progress has been made in developing novel sonification systems
to further support network-monitoring tasks, but many of these
systems have not been sufficiently validated, and there is a
lack of uptake in SOCs. Furthermore, little guidance exists
on design requirements for the sonification of network data.
In this paper, we identify the key role that sonification, if
implemented correctly, could play in addressing shortcomings
of traditional network-monitoring methods. Based on a review of
prior research, we propose an approach to developing sonification
systems for network monitoring. This approach involves the
formalisation of a model for designing sonifications in this space;
identification of sonification design aesthetics suitable for real-
time network monitoring; and system refinement and validation
through comprehensive user testing. As an initial step in this
system development, we present a formalised model for designing
sonifications for network-security monitoring. The application of
this model is demonstrated through our development of prototype
sonification systems for two different use-cases within network-
security monitoring.
Keywords–Sonification; Network Security; Anomaly Detection;
Network Monitoring; Formalised Model; Situational Awareness.
I. INTRODUCTION
The cybersecurity of enterprises crucially depends on the
monitoring capabilities of the Security Operations Centres
(SOCs) operating on their behalf, aiming to maintain network
and systems security; in particular, their ability to detect and
respond to cyber-attack. Organisations today are frequently
the target of cyber-attacks, the nature of which varies widely
from ransomware to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks to the
exfiltration of sensitive data by insiders, for example. These
attacks can be highly damaging both financially, and in terms
of the reputation of the organisation. In the face of a constantly
evolving set of threats and attack vectors, and changing busi-
ness operations, there is a constant requirement for effective
monitoring tools in SOCs to both automatically and semi-
automatically detect attacks.
One of the key challenges that SOCs face in monitoring
large networks is the huge volume of data and metadata that
can be present on the network. This consists of both the data
created by the day-to-day operations of the enterprise, and
the data created by security tools. For real-time monitoring,
tools that present this data in a form that can be processed in
negligible time are essential [1]. Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDSs) and visualisations are general examples of classes of
tools that are widely used to convey information pertaining
to network security in a form that can be easily understood
by analysts. The detection algorithms that usually underlie
such tools have certain limitations, and can produce false-
positive and false-negative results [2,3]. Detecting attacks, and
recognising which risks must be prioritised over other attacks
and malign activities is difficult, and the degree of inaccuracy
in detection systems can make it even more so.
Sonification can provide a potential solution to the chal-
lenges of network-security monitoring in SOCs. Sonification
is the presentation of data in an audio (generally non-speech)
form. Over the last two decades, the incorporation of sonifi-
cation systems into the monitoring activity of SOCs has been
considered [1]. A range of systems has been proposed in which
sonified data are presented to support security analysts in
their network-monitoring tasks. Some prior work has provided
strong evidence of the role sonification could play in improving
SOC monitoring capabilities. It has already been shown, for
example, that using sonification techniques enables users to
detect false-positives from IDSs more quickly [4]. However,
the use of sonification systems in this context has not been
sufficiently validated, and there is a lack of uptake in SOCs.
Sonification has not yet been used operationally in SOCs to
our knowledge. Based on the current state of the art, there
are clear needs for further research and testing to validate the
usefulness of sonification for efficient network monitoring, and
to develop appropriate and effective sonifications to enhance
network-monitoring capabilities.
This paper is an extension of a survey paper by Axon et
al. [1]. In that paper, the major developments over the last two
decades in sonification and multimodal systems for network
monitoring were reviewed, with particular focus on approaches
to design and user testing. That article also contributed a
research agenda for advancing the field. This agenda included
comprehensive user testing to assess the extent to which,
and ways in which, sonification techniques can be useful for
network-monitoring tasks in SOCs; the development of aes-
thetic sonifications appropriate for use in continuous network-
monitoring tasks; and the formalisation of an approach to
sonifying network-security data. In this paper, we extend
that work by proposing an approach to designing sonification
systems for network-security monitoring, and presenting a
formalised sonification model as part of that approach. We
illustrate the application of the model by using it to design
two different sonification-system prototypes.
The remainder of this paper is structured in six sections:
in Section II, we present traditional approaches to network
monitoring and detail their shortcomings. Section III presents
a review of prior work in using sonification for network mon-
itoring, and highlights outstanding challenges in the field. In
Section IV, we propose an approach to developing sonification
systems for real-time network monitoring. We present our
initial work in a part of this approach – the formalisation of
a sonification design model – in Section V. In Section VI
we apply this model to develop prototype sonification systems
for two different use-cases within network-security monitoring.
We conclude in Section VII, and indicate directions for future
work.
II. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO NETWORK-SECURITY
MONITORING
Network-security monitoring is generally conducted by
security analysts, who observe activity on the network –
usually using a variety of tools – in order to detect security
breaches. According to the UK government’s Cyber Security
Breaches Survey for companies across the UK, published in
May 2016, two-thirds (65%) of large organisations reported
that they had detected a security breach in the last twelve
months, with the most costly single breach experienced by
an organisation during that time purported to have cost £3
million [5]. In the face of such frequent and potentially costly
breaches, network-monitoring and attack-detection capabilities
are of extremely high importance.
A variety of tools are used in network monitoring: IDSs,
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs), visualisations, textual
presentations, and firewalls are some of the tools with which
analysts conduct their monitoring tasks. The subject of our
research is primarily detection, rather than prevention capa-
bilities. We therefore focus on IDSs and anomaly-detection
techniques. We also describe the data-presentation methods
generally used to convey network-security monitoring infor-
mation to security analysts – security visualisation tools, and
text-based interfaces.
Network monitoring is largely based on alerts given by
IDSs. Many IDSs have been based on Denning’s model [6].
In general, there are two types of IDS. Anomaly-based IDSs
monitor network traffic, and compare it against an established
baseline (based on bandwidth, protocols, ports, devices, and
connections that are “normal”). Signature-based IDSs, on the
other hand, compare packets monitored on the network against
a database of signatures or attributes from known malicious
threats [2]. Leading SOCs typically craft their own signatures,
defined by analysts in the form of rules. Recent advances
automate the collection and analysis of data from a range
of sources such as logs and IDS alerts using novel Machine
Learning and Data Mining approaches.
Anomaly-detection techniques describe methods for the
detection of changes in systems that may indicate the presence
of threat, and so be of interest from a monitoring perspective.
In contrast with signature- or rule-based detection, which
relies on comparison with known attack signatures, in anomaly
detection, the state of the network is monitored and compared
with a “normal” baseline. Anomalous activity is that which
exceeds an acceptable threshold difference from this baseline.
Anomaly detection often informs the output of IDSs and
visualisations. There are several reports reflecting on the state
of the art in anomaly-detection techniques [2,7,8]. In general,
we can divide anomaly-detection methods into three categories
[2, 9]: detection methods based on Statistics, in which values
are compared against a defined acceptable range for deviation
[10, 11]; detection methods based on Knowledge Systems, in
which the current activity of the system is compared against a
rule-based “normal” activity [12]; and detection methods based
on Machine Learning, automated methods in which systems
learn about activities and detect whether these are anomalous
through supervised or unsupervised learning [7, 13].
Data-presentation techniques convey network-security
monitoring information to security analysts. Command-line
interfaces are commonly used mediums for presenting the
output of network-monitoring appliances such as IDSs and
network firewalls. Security visualisations are another widely-
used class of tool that convey the output of automated detec-
tion tools, and may also present information about the raw
network data. While some security-visualisation systems are
very basic, there are a number of recent surveys of the state
of the art in visualising complex network data. Zhang et al.
[14] and Etoty et al. [15] present reviews as of 2012 and
2014 respectively, reporting research into improving graphical-
layout and user-interaction techniques [16, 17]. Visualisations
generally work by mapping network-data parameters to visual
parameters, such that analysts can observe the changes in
the visualisation presented and from this deduce changes in,
and information about, the network. The design of effective
visualisation involves identifying mappings that represent the
data in a way that can be understood by security analysts, in
SOCs for example, without inducing cognitive overload, and
can clearly convey information pertaining to the security of
the network.
There are certain drawbacks to current approaches to the
monitoring and analysis of security data. Existing automated
techniques can be unreliable or inaccurate. Signature-based
IDSs may suffer from poorly-defined signatures, and are
limited to detecting only those attacks for which signatures
are known. The algorithms underlying anomaly-detection tech-
niques using Statistics or Machine Learning also produce
false-positives and false-negatives [2, 3]. There is, therefore,
a requirement to identify improved anomaly-detection meth-
ods. Alongside ongoing research into improving the accuracy
of automated detection methods, one avenue that has been
researched in security-visualisation work is the detection of
anomalies by humans observing aspects of the network data
[18].
Given the potential inaccuracy of the alerts produced by
the automated detection-system used, it is important that the
human analyst has situational awareness and an understanding
of the network state, in order that he can interpret alerts and
accurately decide their validity; this is one of the key roles of
data-presentation techniques. A shortcoming of existing text-
based and visualisation-based network-monitoring systems is
the requirement that operators dedicate their full attention to
the display in order to ensure that no information is missed
– for real-time monitoring especially – which can restrict
their ability to perform other tasks. Furthermore, the number
of visual dimensions and properties onto which data can be
mapped is limited [19], and the presentation of large amounts
of information visually may put strain on the visual capacity
of security analysts.
III. NETWORK MONITORING USING SONIFICATION
Based on the shortcomings we identify in existing moni-
toring techniques, we believe that sonification may have the
potential to improve monitoring capabilities in SOCs, in a
number of ways. While many promising advances have been
made recently in novel data-analytics approaches in particu-
lar, we highlight that automated network-monitoring systems
do not always produce reliable outputs. Presenting network-
monitoring information as a continuous sonification could im-
prove analysts’ awareness of the network-security state, aiding
their interpretation of the alerts given by automated systems.
Such awareness could also enable analysts to detect patterns,
recognise anomalous activity and prioritise risks differently
from the way their systems do, acting as a human anomaly-
detector of sorts.
Sonification could also offer a solution to the shortcomings
of current data-presentation techniques – in particular, text-
based presentation and security visualisations – as an extra
interface that requires humans to use their sense of hearing
rather than vision. It is important to design representations of
large volumes of network data that are as easy as possible for
analysts to use, understand and act on. A potential advantage
of using sonification in this context is that sound can be
presented for peripheral listening. This means that, if designed
correctly, sonification could enable analysts to monitor the
network-security state as a non-primary task, whilst performing
other main tasks. Furthermore, using sound offers another set
of dimensions in addition to visual dimensions onto which
data can be mapped. The addition of sonification to existing
visualisation-based or text-based data presentation approaches
could provide a useable method of monitoring highly complex,
multivariate network data.
A. Sonification: a Background
Sonification is the presentation of data in an audio (gen-
erally non-speech) form. It is used in numerous fields, such
as financial markets, medicine (Electroencephalography (EEG)
monitoring [20], image analysis [21]) and astronomy. User
testing has validated that the presentation of sonified data
can improve certain capabilities in a number of applications:
improved accuracy in monitoring the movement of volatile
market indices by financial traders [22], and improved capa-
bilities for exploratory analysis of EEG data [23], for example.
A variety of techniques and guidelines have been developed
for the design and implementation of sonification [24–27].
Throughout sonification literature there are three main ap-
proaches recognised: earcons/event-based sonification (discrete
sounds representing a defined event), parameter-mapping soni-
fication (PMSon – in which changes in some data dimen-
sions are represented by changes in acoustic dimensions), and
model-based sonification (in which the user interacts with a
model and receives some acoustic response derived from the
data).
The current state of the art in sonification for network and
server monitoring is summarised by Rinderle-Ma et al. [19],
who identify systems for the sonification of computer-security
data, in various stages of maturity. It is concluded that there
is a lack of formal user and usability testing, even in those
systems that are already fully developed [28–30]. Our survey
work differs from that of Rinderle-Ma et al.: while that survey
gives an overview of the design approaches taken in some
existing sonification systems, our survey provides much greater
detail on the sonification design of existing systems in terms
of sonification techniques, sound mapping types, the network
data and attack types represented and the network-monitoring
scope. Furthermore, in this paper we propose an approach to
designing and testing the utility of sonification systems for
network monitoring, and we go on to actually report on the
implementation of that research vision, namely our work on the
development of a formalised model for designing sonifications















Figure 1. A summary of the existing relationship between traditional
monitoring techniques and their potential relationship with sonification
systems in SOCs.
Figure 1 shows the existing relationship between raw data,
anomaly-detection techniques, network-monitoring appliances
such as IDSs, and data-presentation techniques, and the posi-
tion we envisage sonification might take in this setup. The
figure shows two approaches to sonifying network-security
monitoring data. In Approach 1, the raw network data is
represented in the sonification – perhaps with some scaling or
sampling methods applied. In Approach 2, the network data is
not sonified in its raw form but is subject to some automated
detection procedure prior to sonification. This either means
that the output of some network-monitoring appliance – an
IDS, for example – is sonified, or that there is some detection
algorithm involved in the sonification method itself prior to
the rendering of the data as sound.
TABLE I. EXAMPLES OF TYPES OF RAW NETWORK DATA
Data Type Description
Packet header The header information for individual packets on the
network (including timestamp, source/destination IP/port,
packet size, for example) from a network packet capture
Netflow Data on collected network flows – sequences of packets
sent over the same connection (including timestamp, flow
duration, source/destination IP/port, for example)
Machine Logs Data recorded at individual machines on the network. For
example, network packets received and sent; processes
running; central processing unit (CPU) usage
In Table I, we clarify the meaning of “raw network data”
as it is used in Figure 1, by illustrating examples of types of
data. The list is not exhaustive, but gives some indication of
the network data to which we refer. These data are examples
of the raw network data that is sonified directly in Approach
1 of Figure 1.
B. Applications of Sonification to Network Monitoring
PEEP, a “network auralizer” for monitoring networks with
sound, is presented in [28]. PEEP is designed to enable
system administrators to detect network anomalies – both
in security and general performance – by comparing sounds
with the sound of the “normally functioning” network. The
focus of PEEP is on the use of “natural” sounds – birdsong,
for example – in sonifying network events. Recordings are
mapped to network conditions (excessive traffic and email
spam, for instance), and are played back to reflect these
conditions. Abnormal events are presented through a change
in the “natural” sounds. PEEP represents both network events
(when an event occurs it is represented by a single natural
sound) and network state (state is represented through sounds
played continuously, which change when there is a change in
some aspects of the state, such as average network load). There
is no experimental validation of the performance of PEEP and
its usefulness for monitoring networks, but the authors report
the ability to hear common network problems such as excessive
traffic using the sonification.
The Stetho network sonification system is given in [31].
Stetho sonifies network events by reading the output of the
Linux tcpdump command, checking for matches using regular
expressions, and generating corresponding Musical Instrument
Digital Interface (MIDI) events, with the aim that the system
creates sounds that are “comfortable as music”. The aim of
Stetho is to convey the status of network traffic, without a
specific focus on anomaly detection. The research includes an
experimental evaluation of the Stetho system – users’ ability
to interpret the traffic load from the sounds generated by
Stetho is examined. The experiment shows that this monitoring
information can be recognised by users from the sounds
created by Stetho; however, only four users (subjects familiar
with network administration) are involved in the evaluation
experiment.
Network Monitoring with Sound (NeMoS) is a network
sonification system in which the user defines network events,
and the system then associates these events with MIDI tracks
[32]. The system is designed to allow monitoring of different
parts of a potentially large network system at once, with a
single musical flow representing the whole state of the part of
the system the system manager is interested in. The focus is not
on network security but on monitoring network performance
in general; printer status and system load, for example, can be
represented through two different sound channels.
More recently, Ballora et al. look to create a soundscape
representation of network state which aids anomaly detection
by assigning sounds to signal certain types and levels of net-
work activity such as unusual port requests [33] (“soundscape”
definition given by Schafer [34]). The concept is a system
capable of combining multiple network parameters through
data fusion to create this soundscape. The fusion approach
is based on the JDL Data Fusion Process Model [35], with
characteristics of the data assigned to multiple parameters of
the sound. The authors aim, firstly, to map anomalous events
to sound and, secondly, to represent the Internet Protocol
(IP) space as a soundscape in which patterns can emerge
for experienced listeners. No user testing is carried out to
establish the usefulness of the system for anomaly-detection
tasks. However, the authors report being able to hear patterns
associated with distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) and port-
scanning attacks (see Table III).
Vickers et al. sonify meta properties of network traffic
data [36] as a countryside soundscape. In that system, the
log returns of successive values of network traffic properties
(number of packets received and sent, number of bytes received
and sent) are used to modulate the amplitude, pan, phase or
spectral characteristics of four sound channels, including the
sound of a running stream and rain. The aim of the system is to
alert the system administrator to abnormal network behaviour
with regard to both performance and security; it is suggested,
for example, that a DDoS attack might be recognisable by the
system’s representation of an increase in certain types of traffic.
There is, however, no evaluation of users’ ability to recognise
such information using the system. Vickers et al. then extend
that work to further explore the potential for using sonification
for network situational awareness [37]. For this context, i.e.,
continuous monitoring for network situational awareness – it is
argued that solutions based on soundscape have an advantage
over other sonification designs, and that there is a need
for sonifications that are not annoying or fatiguing and that
complement the user’s existing sonic environment.
A soundscape approach is also adopted in the InteNtion
system [29] for network sonification. Here, network traffic
analysis output is converted to MIDI and sent to synthesisers
for dynamic mixing; the output is a soundscape composed
by the network activity generally rather than the detection of
suspicious activity specifically. It is argued that the system
could be used to help administrators detect attacks; however
this is not validated through user testing. DeButts is a student
project available online in which network data is sonified
with the aim of aiding security analysts to detect anomalous
incidents in network access logs [38].
Garcı´a-Ruiz et al. investigate the application of sonification
as a teaching and learning tool for network intrusion detection
[39, 40]. This work includes an exploratory piece in which
information is gathered regarding the subjects’ preferred au-
ditory representations of attacks. Sonification prototypes are
given for the mapping of log-registered attacks into sound. The
first uses animal sounds – auditory icons – for five different
types of attack (“guess”, “rcp”, “rsh”, “rlogin”, “port-scan”);
the second uses piano notes at five different frequencies as
earcons to represent the five types of attack. Informal testing
was carried out for these two prototypes, and suggested that
the earcons were more easily identifiable, while the subjects
could recall the attack types more easily using the auditory
icons. While this is a useful start to comparing approaches
to sonification design for network data, the mappings tested
are limited, and further research is required into mappings
involving other sound and data types.
Systems have been proposed to sonify the output of existing
IDSs, and to act as additions to the function of these systems.
Gopinath’s thesis uses JListen to sonify a range of events
in Snort Network Intrusion Detection System (a widely used
open-source network IDS for UNIX derivatives and Windows)
to signal malicious attacks [4]. The aim is to explore the
usefulness of sonification in improving the accuracy of IDS
alert interpretation by users; usability studies indicate that
sonification may increase user awareness in intrusion detection.
Experiments are carried out to test three hypotheses on the
usability and efficacy of sonifying Snort. The findings are:
musical knowledge has no significant effect on the ability
of subjects to use the system to find intrusions; sonification
decreases the time taken to detect false positives; immediate
monitoring of hosts is possible with a sonified system. As
noted by Rinderle-Ma et al. [19], however, the comparison
is somewhat biased since the control group without auditory
TABLE II. REVIEW OF APPROACHES TO AND USER TESTING IN EXISTING SONIFICATION SYSTEMS
FOR NETWORK MONITORING, ORDERED BY YEAR.










































































































































2002 Multimodal system: visualisation conveys status of
network nodes; sonification conveys additional details




































































2004 Combines network events rendered as spatial audio
with 3D stereoscopic visuals to form a multimodal
representation of network information. Sounds are
















Qi [43] 2007 Maps traffic pattern (classified, queued and scheduled)
to audio; bytes and packet rate are mapped to











2008 Auditory icons (non-instrumental) and earcons




















2009 Proposed system maps raw network traffic to sound to
convey information on network status; current system
maps properties of traffic classified as disruptive by















2011 Parameter-mapping soundscape for overall IP space;














2012 MIDI messages mapped to data output by SharpPCap
library network traffic analysis; MIDI messages mixed










2014 Maps distinct notification tones to anomalous network
















2014 Parameters of each sound generator (voice) mapped to











2015 Multimodal system for real-time sonification of
large-scale network data. Maps data parameters and
events to sound; parameter-mapping sonification












2015 Multimodal system for representing data on military
networks, in which each source and destination IP is
mapped to an instrument and pitch, and the loudness

















support had to conduct the tasks by reading log files, without
access to the visualisation-based tools to which the group
tested with auditory support had access.
Multimodal systems, that combine visualisation and soni-
fication for network monitoring, have also been explored.
Varner and Knight present such a system in [41]. Visualisation
is used to convey the status of network nodes; sonification
then conveys additional details on network nodes selected
by the user. This multimodal approach is useful because it
combines advantages of the two modalities – the spatial nature
of visualisation, and the temporal nature of sonification – to
produce an effective and usable system. Garcı´a et al. describe
the benefits and pitfalls of using multimodal human-computer
interfaces for the forensic analysis of network logs for attacks.
A sonification method is proposed for IDSs as part of a
multimodal interface, to enable analysts to cope with the
large amounts of information contained in network logs. The
sonification design approach is not detailed, and the system is
not tested with users.
The CyberSeer [42] system uses sound to aid the presenta-
tion of network-security information with the aim of improving
network-monitoring capability. Sound is used as an additional
variable to data-visualisation techniques to produce an audio-
visual display that conveys information about network traffic
log data and IDS events. The requirement for user testing to
establish the most effective audio mappings is recognised, but
no testing is carried out. Garcı´a-Ruiz et al. describe the benefits
and pitfalls of using multimodal human-computer interfaces
for analysing intrusion detection [46]. A sonification method
is proposed for IDSs as part of a multimodal interface, to
enable analysts to cope with the large amounts of information
contained in network logs.
Qi et al. present another multimodal system for detecting
intrusions and attacks on networks in [43]; distinctive sounds
are generated for a set of attack scenarios consisting of
DoS and port scanning. The authors stipulate that the sounds
generated could enable humans to recognise and distinguish
between the two types of attack; however, user testing is
needed to validate this conclusion and investigate the extent to
which this approach is effective. A similar approach is adopted
by Brown et al. [44]: the bit-rates and packet-rates of a delay
queue are sonified in a system for intrusion detection.
NetSon [30] is a system for real time sonification and
visualisation of network traffic, with a focus on large-scale
organisations. In this work, there are no user studies, but the
system is being used at Fraunhofer IIS, a research institution,
who provide a live web stream of their installation [47]. Mi-
crosoft have a multimodal system, Specimen Box, for real-time
retrospective detection and analysis of botnet activity. It has not
yet been presented in a scientific publication, but a description
and videos of the functioning system are presented online [48].
The system has not been subject to formal evaluation, but is
used in operations at the Microsoft Cybercrime Centre.
Mancuso et al. conducted user testing to assess the use-
fulness of sonification of network data for military cyber
operations [45]. Participants were tasked with detecting target
packets matching specific signatures (see Table III), using
either a visual display (a visual interface that emulated network
packet analysis software such as Wireshark) only, or both
visual and sonified displays. The aim of the testing was
to assess the extent to which sonification can improve the
performance and manage the workload of, and decrease the
stress felt by, users conducting cyber-monitoring operations
on military networks. The testing results show that the use
of sonifications in the task did not improve participants’
performance, workload or stress. However, only one method
of sonifying the data was tested, in which each possible source
and destination IP address was represented by a different
instrument and note, and the loudness increased if a threshold
packet size was exceeded. The results do not, therefore, show
that using sonification does not improve performance, stress
and workload in this context, but demonstrate only that this













Approach 1: [28–33,36, 42–45]
Approach 2: [4, 38, 40,
44]
Figure 2. A summary of the data types used in previous network data
sonification approaches.
In Figure 2 we show the approaches taken in previous
work to designing network-data sonifications, in terms of the
type of network data sonified. In this figure, we position the
existing sonification systems surveyed onto the monitoring
tool relationships diagram presented in Figure 1. Previously-
proposed sonifications of network-security data can be divided
into two sets: those that take Approach 1 (in which the
sonification system takes as input some raw network data,
with scaling functions applied such that the sonification is a
representation of the raw network data itself), and those that
take Approach 2 (in which the systems sonifies the output of
some network monitoring tool such as an IDS, or sonifies the
output of some inbuilt anomaly detection technique).
In Table II, we summarise the sonification design tech-
niques used and user testing carried out in prior work. In Table
III we examine in greater detail those existing sonification
systems developed for enabling attack detection by sonifying
raw network data specifically (Approach 1 represented in
Figure 2). For each system, we present the types of attacks
targeted, and the network data features represented in the
sonification. We summarise the reported effectiveness of these
systems for “hearing” cyber attacks.
In summary, some prior work shows that sonification sys-
tems have promising potential to enable network-security mon-
itoring capabilities. Previously-designed sonification systems
have been reported to produce sonic patterns from which it is
possible to “hear” cyber attacks [28, 33, 36, 43]. In particular,
it is reported that DoS attacks and port-scanning attacks can
be heard in previous systems sonifying raw network data.
User testing has shown that other sonification design attempts
were not useful for network-security monitoring tasks [45];
however, the sonification designs and applications tested in
this work were limited, and this result is not comprehensive
TABLE III. ATTACK DETECTION AND NETWORK DATA FEATURE REPRESENTATION IN PREVIOUS SONIFICATION SYSTEMS.
Author Network data features sonified Can attacks be “heard”? Attacks targeted
Gilfix
[28]
Incoming and outgoing mail; average traffic load; number
of concurrent users; bad DNS queries; telnetd traffic;
others unspecified
Not assessed, but authors report ability to “easily
detect common network problems such as high load,








Packet rate; others not specified Not assessed
Qi [43] Packet rate; byte rate No experimental assessment, but authors report that
the system produced sounds “notably” different
enough that distinguishing between DoS and port
scanning attacks is “relatively easy”, while no sounds




Prolonged increase in traffic volume; number of TCP




Source IP address; destination IP address; frequency of
packets in ongoing socket connections; packet rate;
requests to unusual ports; geographic location of sender
(suggested but not implemented)
Not assessed, but authors report finding “that patterns
associated with intrusion attempts such as port scans
and denials of service are readily audible”
Dataset used contains DoS and
port-scanning attacks
Giot [29] Packet size; Time-to-Live (TTL) of packet; bandpass of
network; source IP address; destination IP address;





Data sonified are log returns of successive instances of the
following values: number of bytes sent; number of packets
sent; number of bytes received; number of packets received
Changes in soundscape not noticeable under “normal”
network conditions; noticeable change occurs when
log returns large (large log return for number of




Source IP address (of packet); destination IP address (of
packet); packet size
Use of sonification alongside the visual interface did
not improve participants’ performance in detecting
“target packets” compared with their performance
using the visual interface alone
Not specific attacks – target packet
characterised by “signatures”: network
transmissions originating from either of
two particular source IP addresses,
directed to either of two destination IP
addresses, using either of two
protocols, with packet size 500 bytes
or more
enough to suggest that further research in this area is futile. It is
clear that variations in sonification design approach may affect
the usefulness of the system for network-security monitoring,
and as such further research is required into appropriate
sonification designs for the context.
C. Outstanding Challenges
Table II presents a summary of the sonification systems
previously developed for network monitoring (solutions for
which full systems or prototypes have been developed). From
this, we have identified the key areas in which research is
lacking: formalisation of a model for designing sonification
systems for network monitoring, identification of data require-
ments, investigation of appropriate sonification aesthetics, and
validation of the utility of the approach through user testing.
In general, a weakness in the articles is the amount of user
testing carried out with the intended users – security analysts.
Table II shows that little user testing has been carried out,
and of that which has, little has specifically targeted security
analysts – it is possible that some of the Air Force Base
personnel who participated in the user testing by Mancuso
et al. were security analysts, but this is not made clear in
that paper [45]. Table II shows also that there has been little
(and no comprehensive) evaluation of the usefulness of existing
sonification systems for network anomaly detection. Gopinath
evaluates the usefulness of a sonification with a focus on
aiding users in monitoring the output of IDSs [4]. Mancuso
et al. evaluate the effectiveness of their sonification system in
enabling users to detect packets matching specific signatures,
but test only one sonification design. There is therefore a clear
need to assess and compare the use of a number of sonification
designs for network anomaly detection. Extensive user testing
is required to validate the usefulness of the approach and of
proposed systems, and to refine the sonification design.
The systems listed vary in the data they represent. Some
map raw network data to sound, some map the output of IDSs,
while some aim to map attacks to sounds. However, there is
no comparison of the efficacy of these approaches, or of the
usefulness of sonic representations of different attack types.
Identification of the network-data sources and features that
should be sonified in order to represent network attacks is
needed. The sonification design approaches used (event-based,
parameter-mapping, and soundscape-based) also vary, as do
the sound types (natural sounds, sounds that are musically
informed) but there is as yet no comprehensive investigation
into, or comparison of, the usefulness of these methods.
Based on this, we propose that comparative research into the
sonification aesthetics most appropriate for use in network
monitoring is crucial, in order to inform sonification design.
We further identify a requirement for the development of a
formalised approach to designing sonifications in this field,
to underpin developments and enable comparison. Next, we
outline our proposed approach to sonification development and
testing, with which we aim to address these issues.
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH
We propose an approach to developing sonification systems
in this space. The approach involves formalising a model for
designing sonifications for network monitoring, identifying
the network data representation requirements, investigating
appropriate design aesthetics for the context, and assessing
the utility of the developed systems through comprehensive
user testing. We believe that these elements combine to form
a solution to the problem of designing and testing the utility
















Figure 3. Proposed approach to designing sonification systems for
network-security monitoring.
Figure 3 shows the parts of our approach, and their
relationship with each other. The formalised network data
sonification model takes as input aesthetic requirements and
data requirements, and incorporates the results of iterative user
testing. We now detail the research questions to be answered
for each part of the approach.
A. Requirement for a Formalised Sonification Model
To enable us to architect and experiment with sonifica-
tions in a flexible way, we need an underpinning sonifica-
tion model. This should enable us to utilise heterogeneous
sonifications alongside each other in order to compare per-
formance. No such model currently exists, and we therefore
propose the development of a formalised model specifically
for developing sonification systems for network monitoring.
This model should describe a grammar for the representation
of network data through parameter-mapping sonification that
enables incorporation of and experimentation with appropriate
design aesthetics, techniques of musical composition, and the
science of auditory perception. It is important that the model
encompasses prior art, and enables comparison with previous
approaches to designing sonifications in this space.
A model for designing sonifications for use in the network-
monitoring context should tailor aspects of sonification design
such as cross-field interference to produce sonifications that
are appropriate for network-monitoring tasks. A simple exam-
ple is a simultaneous change in two network parameters: a
statistically significant increase in traffic load, and messages
received from an IP address that is known to be malicious
(these two changes would generally be found by the statistical
anomaly-based IDSs and signature-based IDSs, respectively,
described in Section II). This could be the result of a DoS
attack, and the sonification system should therefore attract
the attention of the analyst. Cross-field interference could be
leveraged through the choice of data-sound mappings used in
this case (with a mapping to higher pitch and increased tempo
– two sound parameters which interact such that each appears
more increased that it really is – for the two data parameters
respectively) to ensure that the attack is highlighted by the
sonification.
In order to prevent sonification designs from causing
listener fatigue, we propose that a rule-based approach to
aesthetic sound generation may be appropriate. In particular,
a sonification model should be non-prescriptive in terms of
musical genre, and be applied to a variety of genres of music
to generate a set of different-sounding sonifications of the
same network data. We hypothesise that with this approach,
users could be allowed to move between a set of musical
genres at choice, each of which would sonify the network
data according to the same grammar, and this could reduce the
fatigue caused by the sounds. Below, we give the key questions
to be addressed in building this model.
• Which are the requirements specific to the
network-security monitoring context for the map-
ping of data to sound? In general, huge quantities of
multivariate and highly complex data move through
organisational computer networks. It is important that
the model enables the sonification designer to reason
about the parts of the data to be sonified, the key
information about these parts that must be conveyed to
the sonification user, and the most appropriate method
of representing this information through sound. For
example, an important task in SOCs is monitoring
the security state of sensitive servers on the network
– this could be those servers containing databases
of customer records. Devising methods of mapping
required information about selected aspects of the
network to sound will be a key part of the model
development process.
• What are the inputs and outputs of the sonifica-
tion model? The sonification model should take as
input both the data requirements for the represen-
tation, and the aesthetics derived: appropriate data-
sound mappings and sound design, and methods of
scaling the data to the sound domain. The model
should provide a method for mapping the required
data to sound, following the aesthetic requirements
input. The model should itself then produce the input
to some sonification software. Adaptability of the
model according to differing aesthetic requirements is
important, particularly as we aim to compare multiple
aesthetic approaches, and refine the aesthetic require-
ment specification through iterative user testing.
• How can we verify that the sonification model is
capable of addressing prior art approaches? In
order to enable comparison of new sonification system
designs with the approaches taken in prior work, it
is important that prior approaches can be replicated
through use of the sonification model developed. We
can verify the correctness of the model for this task
by verifying that it has some representation of each
relevant prior sonification approach.
B. Data Requirements
The data requirements include firstly the data sources used,
since these produce different data types. For example packet
capture header data might be represented – a different data type
to machine log data (including machine CPU, for example) or
file access log data. The data requirements must also include
the data features addressed. These are the properties of the
data that we choose to sonify, and may be low-level properties
(such as a representation of source IP address from which each
packet is received) or may be attack-detection features (such
as packet rate thresholds against which data are compared).
The data requirements depend to a large part on the use-
case. In developing sonification systems for anomaly detection
by humans, data requirements should be derived from infor-
mation about all data sources and features that enable network
anomaly detection, and through which attacks are conveyed.
On the other hand, for use in a multimodal system, which
conveys part of the network data sonically while other data
is conveyed visually, the sonification data requirements would
depend on which data had been selected to convey visually,
and which using the sonification. As another example, if the
aim of sonification was to enable analysts to monitor network
security as a non-primary task, the data requirements should be
informed by the data sources that analysts may be frequently
required to monitor while simultaneously conducting other
tasks – these sources might include IDS alert logs, or the logs
of critical servers on the network, for example.
• Which data sources should be included in develop-
ing sonifications for network-security monitoring
purposes? It is important to identify those sources
for which a sonified representation might add value
in network monitoring; these might be raw network
data sources such as packet captures, Netflow or
Domain Name System (DNS) logs, or the sources
might be monitoring systems such as IDSs or network
firewalls. Buchanan et al. categorised the potential
data sources used by security analysts in answering
a number of different analytical questions (for exam-
ple, in searching for the activities associated with a
particular suspicious IP address) [49]. We hypothesise
that raw network packet capture data is most suitable
for network attack detection, because this constitutes a
full representation of traffic on the network. However,
it would be valuable to identify the network data
sources security analysts consider most useful for
network attack detection, and the methods by which
those sources are currently monitored. For example,
the information output of multiple such data sources
are often integrated in Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM) tools for monitoring by analysts.
• Which data properties or features should be soni-
fied to enable network anomaly detection by ana-
lysts? In order to identify the data properties to be rep-
resented, attack characterisation can be used to extract
the ways in which classes of network attacks (flooding
attacks, for example) manifest in the network data
sources selected for representation in the sonification.
Some prior work identifies network data features for
network anomaly detection, and for the detection of
particular classes of threat such as Advanced Persistent
Threats (APTs) and Botnets [50–52]. Some of this
work involves interviews with security analysts to
identify the properties of data analysts search for in
network security monitoring to enable attack detection
[49, 53]. The findings from attack characterisation
and prior work can be bolstered through interviews
with security analysts, to gather their views on the
importance of particular network data features for
network attack detection.
C. Sonification Aesthetics
While there has been some work in aesthetic sonification,
as reported in Section III, it has not been heavily applied
in the context of network monitoring. Prior work indicates
that sonification aesthetic impacts on its effectiveness. In an
experiment comparing sonifications of guidance systems, for
example, it was shown that sonification strategies based on
pitch and tempo enabled higher precision than strategies based
on loudness and brightness [54]. It was also shown in [55] that
particular sonification designs resulted in better participant per-
formance in identifying features of Surface Electromyography
data for a range of different tasks involved.
The aesthetics of the design are an important factor in
producing sonifications that are suitable for continuous pre-
sentation in this context. In particular, the sounds should be
unfatiguing [37, 56] and, if intended for use in non-primary
task monitoring, should achieve a balance in which they are
unobtrusive to the performance of other tasks while drawing
sufficient attention when necessary to be suitable for SOC
monitoring. While there are other techniques that may be
useful, we propose an approach to this design that draws
on techniques and theories of musical composition. We can
draw on work in aesthetic sonification by Vickers [56], and
on work in musification, i.e., the design of sonifications that
are musical. Some key questions to be answered regarding
sonification aesthetics for network-security monitoring are
described below.
1) Which are the most appropriate mappings from
network-security data to sound? Prior work has indi-
cated preferred mappings from data to sound in certain
contexts; for mapping physical quantities such as speed
and size, for example [57]. Useful parallels can be drawn
between these previous experiments and the network-
monitoring context, and hypotheses can thus be made
about appropriate data-sound mappings. However, it is
important to perform a context-specific assessment of
these mappings, in terms of their ability to convey the
required network-monitoring information in a way that
users can comprehend. Associations formed through the
previous experiences of users may affect the ease with
which they can use certain mappings; for example, based
on prior work we might expect a mapping from packet
rate to tempo of music to be intuitive. We propose that
user experiments should be carried out as part of the
sonification design process, to establish which mappings
from data to sound are most appropriate. The results of
these user experiments will form an input to the sets of
data-sound mappings used in the sonification model, as
shown in Figure 3.
2) Which sonification aesthetics are suitable for use in
network-security monitoring in SOCs? Comparison of
a range of musical aesthetics (for example, a comparison
between Classical Music and Jazz Music), should be
carried out to identify those most suitable for the context.
In particular, aesthetics that are unfatiguing, unobtrusive
to other monitoring work, and able to attract the required
level of attention from analysts, should be chosen. It
may be that a suitable approach is to enable analysts
to choose between a selection of musical aesthetics at
will. It is important to assess the extent to which musi-
cal experience affects the ability of security analysts to
use musically-informed sonification systems in network-
monitoring tasks. The effect of users’ musical experience
on their ability to understand and make use of the soni-
fication systems design will require investigation. Here,
musical experience refers to the level of prior theoretical
and aural musical training attained by the user. For this
SOC monitoring context, analysts’ use of the systems
should not be impaired by a lack of musical experience.
3) What granularity of network-security monitoring in-
formation can we represent usefully using sonifica-
tion? Given the huge volumes of network data observed
on organisational networks, and the high speed of packet
traffic on these networks, it should be assumed that
some scaling or aggregation will be required in the sonic
representation of certain data sources. The amount of
information that can be conveyed through sound should
be identified. This is both in the sense that sonification
software is actually capable of rendering the information,
and that humans can usefully interpret the information
presented and hear the network data required for anomaly
detection, i.e. that the sound is not overwhelming. Meth-
ods for producing network data inputs that can be usefully
rendered as sound, such as aggregating packets over
time intervals, or scaling quantities such as packet rate,
should then be experimented with. Sampling packets is
another possible approach; for example, Worrall uses
sampled network packets as the input to his network data
sonification using the Sflow tool, which takes packets
from the traffic stream at a known sampling rate [30].
Comparative testing would be valuable at this stage to
assess the levels of granularity of data sonification at
which network anomalies can be heard. The results of
this assessment of appropriate data granularity will form
an input to the scaling functions of the sonification model,
as shown in Figure 3.
Besides aesthetics, aspects of human perception must in-
fluence the design: the prior associations sounds may hold for
users and the way in which this affects interpretation; the effect
of musical experience on perception. It is important that the
design takes into account factors in perception such as cross-
field interference (in which different dimensions of sound –
pitch and tempo, for example – interact in a way that affects
perception of either) and does not induce cognitive overload
for the user.
D. Comprehensive User Studies
As well as addressing sonification-aesthetic requirements
through iterative user testing, we need to conduct user ex-
periments to investigate the utility of sonification systems for
network-security monitoring tasks. Section III indicates that
of the proposals made for sonification systems for network
monitoring, very few have conducted any user testing. None
have conducted testing to the extent required for an appropriate
understanding of the use of these systems and their suitability
for actual deployment in security monitoring situations. As
such, we identify a requirement for significantly more in-
context user testing of sonifications for network-monitoring
tasks, carried out with security analysts in SOCs, to inform the
design and investigate the advantages and disadvantages of the
approach. It is important that sonification systems are tested
in the SOC environment, in order to investigate how well they
incorporate with the particular characteristics of SOCs – a va-
riety of systems running simultaneously, collaborative working
practice, high levels of attention required from workers.
We will conduct user testing to investigate the hypothesis
that sonification can improve the network-monitoring capabil-
ities of security analysts. This hypothesis is proposed in light
of prior work in other fields in which it is proven that certain
capabilities can be improved by the presentation of sonified
data, as outlined in Section III, and of the limited experimental
evidence that shows that sonification can be useful for tasks
involving network data specifically [4, 31].
For the validation of sonification as a solution to improving
network-monitoring capabilities, there are certain key research
questions that need to be answered through user testing.
1) To what extent, and in what ways, can the use of
sonification improve the monitoring capabilities of
security analysts in a SOC environment? User testing is
required to establish the extent to which sonification can
aid security analysts in their network-monitoring tasks.
We theorise that there may be a number of use-cases for
sonification of network data in SOCs. For example, inves-
tigation is needed to establish whether the presentation of
network data through sonification can enable analysts to
“hear” patterns and anomalies in the data, and in this
way detect anomalies more accurately than systems in
any cases. Given the strong human capability for pattern
recognition in audio representations [56, 58, 59], and for
contextualising information, it is plausible that a system
that presents patterns in network data may enable the
analyst to detect anomalies with greater accuracy than
traditional rule-based systems. User testing should also
establish whether presenting sonified network data can
enable analysts to monitor the network as a non-primary
task, maintaining awareness of the network-security state
while carrying out other exploratory or incident-handling
tasks. Finally, we propose user testing to assess whether
multimodal systems, which fuse visualisations and soni-
fications of complex data – which might usually be
presented visually across multiple monitors, for example
– can aid analysts in their network-monitoring tasks.
2) Are there certain types of attack and threat that sonify
more effectively than others, and what implications
does this have for the design of sonification systems
for network monitoring? It may be the case that certain
types of attacks are better-represented through sonification
than others, and that some attacks sound anomalous in a
way that is particularly easy for analysts to use while
others do not sonify well. Findings on this subject should
inform sonification system design by distinguishing the
attacks and threats in relation to which sonification per-
forms best, and the areas in which the technique therefore
has the potential to be most effective.
3) How does the performance of the developed sonifica-
tion tools in enabling network attack detection com-
pare with the performance of other network attack
detection tools? The performance of users in network
attack detection using sonification alone, and using net-
work monitoring setups incorporating sonification, should
be compared to their performance using visualisation and
text-based interfaces. Users’ performances in detecting
network attacks using the sonification should also be
compared with the performance of automated systems
such as IDSs. It is important to compare the attack detec-
tion performance (in terms of accuracy and efficiency)
of humans using the sonification to that of automated
systems, for particular classes of network attack.
Answers to these questions will provide a greater un-
derstanding of the role sonification can play in improving
monitoring capabilities in SOCs, the limits of the approach,
and the extent to which it can be reliable as a monitoring
technique. In conducting this testing, we expect to draw from
existing research on conducting user studies in general, and in
a security context [60, 61].
V. FORMALISED MODEL FOR THE SONIFICATION OF
NETWORK SECURITY DATA
In this section, we expand on our proposal in Section IV by
presenting a formalised approach for the musical parameter-
mapping sonification of network-security data. In particular,
we focus on our formalised sonification model (as introduced
in Section IV.A). We first identify requirements for sonifying
network-security data, and from these requirements, construct
a model for developing sonifications for network-security
monitoring uses.
Some work in formalising the sonification of data has been
presented previously. For parameter-mapping sonification, a
formalised representation of the sonification mapping function
is given by Hermann [23]. That representation was the basis of
the parameter-mapping sonification model that we developed
for network-security monitoring. In Hermann’s representation,
the parameter-mapping function g : Rd → Rm describes the
mapping from a d-dimensional dataset 〈x1, ...,xd〉 ∈ R
d to an
m-dimensional vector of acoustic attributes which are param-
eters of the signal generator. The q-channel sound signal s(t)
is computed as a function f : Rm+1 → Rq of the parameter-
mapping function g applied to the dataset, and time t:
s(t) = ∑di=1 f(g(xi), t).
In developing our model, we draw on de Campo’s Sonifica-
tion Design Space Map (SDSM), which describes the questions
to be addressed in any sonification design process [62]. The
map presents, as axes, three key questions for reasoning about
data aspects in sonification design. We also use the work of
Hermann [23]; in particular, we extend Hermann’s parameter-
mapping sonification formalisation, by addressing the design
questions indicated by the SDSM.
A. Requirements of the Model
In what follows, we describe the use of the SDSM design
questions to extract requirements for the model. We present
each question, then consider context-specific answers. We thus
identify requirements particular to sonification for network-
security monitoring.
• Question 1: How many data points are required for
patterns to emerge?
The presentation of network data at a range of differ-
ent resolutions may be required for different monitor-
ing applications – see Subsection IV.B:
Requirement 1: the model should enable any
number of data points to be represented.
• Question 2: What properties of data dimensions
should be represented?
The properties of data dimensions represented should
be those through which indicators of attacks are
shown. These may vary based on the network type
and the source of the monitoring information:
Requirement 2: the model should enable the
inclusion of appropriate data dimensions for
individual designs.
Furthermore, these dimensions may be continuous
(for example, packet rate), or discrete (for example,
direction of packet flow – incoming/outgoing). Appro-
priate mapping of both continuous and discrete data
dimensions should be enabled in order to prevent un-
necessary loss of resolution in the data representation
(for example, there would be a loss of resolution in a
representation in which data with continuous values,
such as packet rate, was mapped to a sound with
a small number of discrete values, such as type of
instrument):
Requirement 3: the model should provide a
systematic method of mapping continuous and
discrete data dimensions to continuous and discrete
sound dimensions.
• Question 3: How many sound streams should be
present in the design?
This depends on the network type, use-case and mon-
itoring information source, but in general network
data is multivariate, with many network elements, data
sources, and packet flows that require monitoring. We
require a method of communicating which of these
streams is represented by particular sounds: we need
to represent information about a number of different
channels of the network data. This means, we need
to know what is happening, and to which parts of the
data:
Requirement 4: the model should allow the inclusion
of appropriate sound channels for individual designs,
and provide a method for systematically identifying
the channels and the dimensions required in the
representation.
The formalised model should also meet certain other
requirements, based on the observations that were made in
Section IV. These can be summarised as follows:
• We argued that sonification aesthetics, and mappings,
require testing for the context in which they are used.
The model should therefore facilitate the insertion
of those data-sound mappings selected, according to
experimental results and user preferences:
Requirement 5: the model should not prescribe
data-sound mappings.
• We also argued that the problem of listening fatigue
may be reduced, if users can select their own music
and change it at will. Furthermore, experimentation
with different musical aesthetics is required to deter-
mine those most suitable for the SOC environment.
Therefore:
Requirement 6: the model should not prescribe
musical genre, and should allow for choice in its
selection.
B. Formalised Sonification Model
In Tables IV and V we present a formalised sonification
model for designing musical parameter-mapping sonifications
for use in network-security monitoring, developed to meet the
requirements identified.
To construct the model, we divided Hermann’s formal-
isation for the parameter-mapping sonification of a dataset
[23] into individual mapping functions for data channels
(corresponding to the channels identified in Requirement 4),
continuous data dimensions and discrete data dimensions
(corresponding to the dimensions identified in Requirements
2 and 3). In Table IV, we define these data channels and
data dimensions. Our approach is well-suited to this particular
context because it allows us to reason about the channels of
information to be presented for each particular use-case. More-
over, we can systematically identify continuous and discrete
data, and their most appropriate mappings to sound. At the
end of this section, we discuss how the model we develop
meets the requirements identified.
The model comprises components (individual parts of the
data and the sound to be mapped, which we present in Table
IV), and relations (by which components are associated with
one another, which we present in Table V). The relations are
described by mapping functions.
A sonification is described by the tuple of its components
and relations (the meaning of each of these is explained in
Tables IV and V):
〈CDR,DDR,VDR,Relc,Reldα,Reldβ,Relv〉.
The relations presented in Table V are described by
the channel-mapping function (which describes the channel
relation Relc) and the dimension-mapping function (which
describes both the dimension relation Reld and the value
relation Relv). We also treat sound dimensions ds as functions
of sound channels cs, which have values in the tuple of sound
values of each sound dimension, vs.
The channel-mapping function ψ:Rn → Rm describes the
mapping from a tuple of n data channels CD = 〈cd1, ...,cdn〉
to a tuple of m sound channels CS = 〈cs1, ...,csm〉. The q-
dimensional sound signal s(t) is computed as the sum over
m sound channels cs of the dimension-mapping function Γ :
R
m+1 → Rq,
s(t) = ∑mi=1 Γi(csi, t),
where csi is the output of the channel-mapping function ψ :
R
n → Rm applied to the data channel cd j and time t:
csi = 〈ψi(cd j, t)| j ∈ {1, ...,n}〉,
and Γi is the tuple of dimension-mapping functions γik, which
are applied to the z data dimensions ddik of the data channels
cd j that were mapped by ψi to sound channel csi, and time
t. The functions γik describe the x continuous dimension
mappings γα1, ...,γαx, and the y discrete dimension mappings
γβ1, ...,γβy, for each sound channel csi:
Γi = 〈γi1, ...,γiz〉= 〈γαi1, ...,γαix,γβi1, ...,γβiy〉.
We now explain how this model meets the requirements we
identified. Since the sound channels and sound dimensions
are left as an abstraction, Requirements 5 and 6 are met.
Requirement 1 is also met through the use of abstract functions
to describe the mappings themselves, meaning the resolution
of the data presentation (number of data points presented) can
be addressed through the choice of a function appropriate to
any particular use of the model.
Requirement 4 is addressed by the division of the
parameter-mapping into channels and dimensions; the channel
mapping function addresses Requirement 4, while the dimen-
sion mapping function addresses Requirement 2. Requirement
3 is met by the division of the dimension mapping function
into a continuous and a discrete mapping function.
Figure 4. Data Sound Mappings Space of the Model
In Figure 4, we illustrate the space of data-sound
parameter-mappings produced by the model. This shows the
mappings from the sets of data channels and data dimensions
(continuous and discrete) to possible sound channels and sound
dimensions. We devised the list of sound channels and sound
dimensions by drawing on sonification design literature such as
a survey by Dubus et al. of sonification mappings used in prior
work [57]; many of the items presented in Figure 4 are further
described in that work. We also considered aspects of musical
composition in creating these lists, which are not necessarily
exhaustive, and can be added to.
VI. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO FACILITATE
PROTOTYPE DESIGN
To illustrate the application of the model, this section
shows how we used it to design two prototype sonifications of
network packet capture data, aimed at two different potential
use-cases of sonification within network-security monitoring.
We begin by presenting the two use-cases we considered. This
is followed by an outline of the network attack characterisation
that we used to derive the attack indicators to be represented
for a defined network-monitoring scope. We demonstrate how
the formalised model was applied, using these attack indica-
tors, to generate prototype sonification systems for the two use-
cases, and we describe the implementation of the prototypes.
TABLE IV. DESCRIPTION AND FORMAL NOTATION OF MODEL COMPONENTS
Component Description Formal Notation
Data channels Parts of the network-security monitoring information, about which
information should be presented, e.g., individual packets, IDS
alerts, sensitive IP addresses on the network
The tuple CD of data channels cd
Data dimensions Types of information we can present about data channels, e.g.,
amount of activity (at network IPs, for example), protocol used (in
packet transmission), CPU usage (of network machines). These can
have continuous or discrete values
The tuple DD of data dimensions dd. The tuple of data dimensions DD is
the concatenation DDα⌢DDβ of the tuple DDα of continuous data
dimensions ddα, and the tuple DDβ of discrete data dimensions ddβ
Data values The values data dimensions can take. These can be continuous or
discrete, e.g. a continuous scale from low to high (for packet rate,
for example); discrete names (of protocols)
The tuple VDdd of data values vddd of the data dimension dd
Sound channels Streams of sound which we can vary sonically, e.g., individual
note events, or separate melodic/instrumental lines
The tuple CS of sound channels cs
Sound dimensions Types of sonic variations we can make to sound channels, e.g.
varying the tempo or loudness at which they are presented, or the
harmonic structure they follow. These can have continuous or
discrete values
The tuple DS of sound dimensions ds. The tuple of sound dimensions DS
is the concatenation DSα⌢DSβ of the tuple DSα of continuous sound
dimensions dsα, and the tuple DSβ of discrete sound dimensions dsβ
Sound values The values sound dimensions can take. These can be continuous or
discrete, e.g. a continuous scale from slow to fast (tempo); discrete
names of instruments
The tuple VSds of sound values vsds of the sound dimension ds
TABLE V. DESCRIPTION AND FORMAL NOTATION OF MODEL RELATIONS
Relation Description Formal Notation
Channel relation Data channels are mapped to sound channels Channel relation Relc: CD↔CS is a total relation between the tuple of
data channels and the tuple of sound channels
Dimension relation Data dimensions are mapped to sound dimensions (which can be
discrete or continuous)
• Continuous dimension relation, in which continuous
data dimensions are mapped to continuous sound
dimensions
• Discrete dimension relation, in which discrete data
dimensions are mapped to continuous or discrete sound
dimensions
Dimension relation Reld : DD↔ DS is a total relation between the tuple of
data dimensions and the tuple of sound dimensions
• Continuous dimension relation Reldα: DDα ↔ DSα is a total
relation between the tuple of continuous data dimensions and
the tuple of continuous sound dimensions
• Discrete dimension relation Reldβ: DDβ ↔ DSβ is a total
relation between the tuple of discrete data dimensions and the
tuple of discrete sound dimensions
Value relation Values of data dimensions are mapped to values of sound
dimensions
For each data dimension dd, mapped to sound dimension ds, value
relation Relvdd : VDdd ↔VSds is a total relation between the tuple of data
values of dd and the tuple of sound values of ds
Finally, we show how the model can be used to capture prior-
art approaches to the sonification of network data.
A. Use-Cases
In Section II we highlighted potential advantages of using
sonification for network monitoring. Here, we extend that
discussion to create two different use-cases for sonification
for network monitoring in SOCs. The first case focuses on
enabling anomaly detection by security analysts deliberately
listening to low-level network data, while the second case
focuses on enabling peripheral monitoring of network-security
information by security analysts as a non-primary task.
The two use-cases have different design requirements, since
they target different modes of monitoring. Vickers differenti-
ates between modes of auditory monitoring [56]. We associate
Use-Case 1 (as described below) with Vickers’ description of
the direct monitoring mode, in which the user deliberately
listens to an audio interface as their main focus of attention,
aiming to extract information or identify salient characteristics.
Use-Case 2 is associated with Vickers’ peripheral monitoring
mode, in which the user focuses attention on another primary
task, while indirectly monitoring required information relating
to another non-primary task, which is presented through a
peripheral auditory display.
Use-Case 1: high-granularity sonification of network data
to enable attack detection through pattern recognition by
human security analysts: Humans have used sound in the past
to detect anomalies with very high levels of resolution; an
example is human sonar operators, who classify underwater
sources by listening to the sound they make [63,64]. Further-
more, sonification systems have been successfully designed
for pattern recognition [58], and anomaly detection [59], for
example, in prior work involving complex datasets.
The motivation for this use-case is that, as described in Sec-
tion II, automated systems such as IDSs do not always detect
attacks effectively or accurately, producing false-positives and
false-negatives [2,3]. Presentation of data to humans in a visual
form, using security visualisations, can enable detection of
malicious network activity that is undetected by automated sys-
tems. Given the human ability for pattern recognition through
listening, it should not be assumed that vision is the most
effective medium for this in all cases without first comparing
performances using vision and hearing experimentally [65].
To enable anomaly detection by humans, we aim to rep-
resent low-level network data with the highest granularity and
resolution of information possible, such that patterns in the
data may emerge naturally.
Use-Case 2: high-level sonification of network data for
monitoring aspects of the network-security state as a non-
primary task: Analysts are required to carry out multiple
tasks while monitoring the network for security breaches,
maintaining an awareness of the security of the network [37].
This may mean, for example, continuing to monitor real-time
network or IDS logs, while exploring or handling a potential
security incident [66]. The aim of sonification in this use-
case is to represent sonically the information that analysts
need to maintain an appropriate awareness of the network-
security state, in such a way that the information can be
effectively monitored as a non-primary task. To produce a
sonification suitable for use in peripheral monitoring tasks,
we aim to present a higher level of information than in Use-
Case 1: summaries of the data to enable comprehension of
network-security state, rather than perception of anomalies and
deviations from the normal.
Vickers argues that visual monitoring methods are not
well suited to situations in which users are required to focus
attention on a primary task, while monitoring other informa-
tion directly, because of the demands this places on visual
attention [56]. He summarises why sonification is well suited
to monitoring peripheral information: “...the human auditory
system does not need a directional fix on a sound source
in order to perceive its presence”. Experimental work has
shown that sonification is an effective method of presenting
information for monitoring as a secondary task. Hildebrandt
et al. compared participants’ performances in monitoring a
simulated production process as a secondary task in three
conditions – visual only, visual with auditory alerts, and visual
with continuous sonification – while solving simple arithmetic
problems as a primary task [67]. The results showed that
participants performed significantly better in the secondary
monitoring task using the continuous sonification than in the
visual, or auditory alert, conditions. Furthermore, secondary
monitoring using the continuous sonification had no significant
effect on participants’ performances in the primary task.
B. Data Requirements: Network Attack Characterisation
Despite the differences in the levels of information required
for the two prototypes, the underlying data requirements are
the same: for both cases, we require network data to be
represented such that attacks are signalled by the sonification.
We therefore used the same attack characterisation as the
basis for both prototypes, enabling us to identify the network
data that should be monitored to indicate the attacks within a
defined network and monitoring information sources scope. We
varied the treatment of the resulting data requirements in the
application of the formalised model, taking into consideration
the purpose of the prototype, and the required resolution of
data presentation. In particular, for Prototype 1, we aimed to
represent all attack indicators derived, while in Prototype 2 we
focused on representing one particular attack indicator derived
– the traffic rate at destination IP addresses on the monitored
network, such that the amount of traffic received at each of
these IPs may be monitored as a non-primary task.
We characterised the data requirements for representing
indicators of attacks that can be detected within a network-
monitoring scope; the scope was defined as follows:
1) The network is a local area network (LAN).
2) The network data monitored is packet header information,
excluding packet contents.
3) Network data is monitored in real-time only (we, there-
fore, excluded aspects such as supply chain attacks on
hardware components during manufacture and transporta-
tion).
With this scope in mind, we considered attacks in the
Mitre Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC) list (https://capec.mitre.org). This is a comprehensive
listing and classification of computer attacks for use by,
amongst others, security analysts. From this list, we selected
attacks that fell within the defined scope. Excluding packet
contents especially enabled us to narrow the scope of attacks
considered initially to a list of around twenty types of attack,
including reconnaissance such as port scanning, and threat
realisation such as service flooding. This is because many
of the attacks listed in CAPEC could not be detected by
monitoring only packet header information without packet
contents.
We characterised the attacks in terms of the way they
are indicated through the network data monitored, i.e. packet
header information. After completing this work, we were able
to produce a summary of the data features needed to capture
indicators of the attacks within the network monitoring scope.
The data features we selected are defined as follows.
• Packets: the flow of packets into, out of or within the
network.
◦ Rate: the amount of traffic.
◦ Direction: The direction in which network
traffic is moving (entering network, leaving
network, moving within network).
◦ Size: the byte count of a packet.
◦ Protocol: the protocol with which traffic is
associated.
Rate: the amount of traffic transmitted
using a particular protocol.
◦ Source IP: the IP from which packets are sent,
within or outside the network.
Rate: the amount of traffic associated with
a source IP address.
Range: the number of source IP addresses
as which traffic is observed.
◦ Destination IP/port: the IP and port to which
packets are sent, within or outside the network.
Rate: the amount of traffic associated with
a destination IP address or port.
Range: the number of destination IP ad-
dresses or ports at which traffic is ob-
served.
The derived data features are shown in Table VI. In the
table, the leftmost three columns display the data features,
while the rightmost three columns show the characterisation
of three examples of attacks (TCP SYN scan, data exfiltration
and DDoS) in terms of these features. The data features entered
in each column are characteristics of those in the preceding
column. For example, rate (third column) is a characteristic
of source IP, (second column), which is itself a characteristic
of packet (first column). The attack characterisation columns
show how we used the data features to characterise three
different network attacks. For example, given a data exfiltration
attack, the data features listed in the second attack characteri-
sation column of Table VI are required.
TABLE VI. NETWORK ATTACK CHARACTERISATION EXAMPLES AND DERIVED DATA PRESENTATION REQUIREMENTS









Attack type: TCP SYN scan Data exfiltration DDoS
Attack
description:
TCP protocol, SYN packets
sent to a range of destination
ports on a host
Data exfiltrated from network
to external
address














Multiple IPs outside network
Rate High High High
Range Wide




One or more IPs inside
network




Ports on single host IP inside
network
Rate
Range Wide (all ports targeted –
scan)
C. Prototype 1: Low-Level Network Data Sonification for
Anomaly Detection by Humans
The aim of Prototype 1 is to sonically represent network
data through which an attack might be signalled with as
high a resolution as possible, in order to enable anomaly
detection through emerging sound patterns. We show how
we applied the model in the design of the sonification by
considering appropriate data channels, dimensions and values.
We develop a prototype design, and highlight challenges in the
implementation.
Here we seek to present prototype designs. The purpose
is not to develop final system designs, but to illustrate the
use of the sonification model for designing sonifications for
particular use-cases within network-security monitoring, and
to demonstrate how the application of the model can be varied
depending on the use for which the sonification is intended.
1) Applying the Sonification Model: We derived the data
channels, data dimensions and data values for the prototype
using the data requirements presented in Table IV. In this
case, in order to achieve the highest possible resolution in the
sonification of these data requirements, we aimed to present, as
closely as possible, each packet captured, and to represent as
much information about each packet as possible as dimensions
of the packet channel. We therefore let the entries in the first
column (a single entry: packets) of Table VI be the tuple of
data channels, and all entries in the second column be the
tuple of data dimensions. The entries in the third column are
then conveyed naturally, through the mapping of the selected
data channels and dimensions (for example, range of source
IPs – third column – does not have a defined mapping, but
is presented through the cumulation of the presentation of the
source IP dimension for each individual packet).
For this prototype, the sonification is described by the tuple
〈CDR,DDR,VDR,Relc,Reldα,Reldβ,Relv〉:
• CDR = 〈cdR1〉= 〈packets〉
• DDR = DDα
⌢
R DDβR = 〈ddαR1,ddαR2,ddαR3,
ddαR4,ddαR5〉
⌢〈dβdR1,dβdR2〉= 〈Source IP,








• Relc is described by the function ψi : R
1 → Rm,
csi = ψi(cd1)
• Reld and Relv are described by the function
Γ : Rm+1 → Rq, Γi=〈γαi1, ...,γαix,γβi1, ...,γβiy〉
∀i ∈ {1, ...,m}
We assume that the IP version is IPV4 in the above descrip-
tion of source and destination IP values. Although source and
destination ports and IPs are not technically continuous they
have such a high number of possible values (232 for IPV4)
that we treat them as such. In describing some data values,
we used a notion of “normal”. This is left as an abstraction
in the model, and describes some expectation for the observed
behaviour of the data dimensions. We discuss how this normal
abstraction might be implemented in sonification designs in
Section VI.E.
To simplify the design process, we describe data values
for rate and size as discrete points of interest (for example,
low, high, narrow, wide). This description does not exclude the
possibility of mapping continuously in the representation, but
allows indication of the polarity required in dimension map-
ping. In sonification, polarity is the direction of the mapping
from data to sound. For example, positive mapping polarity
from the data dimension rate to the sound dimension amplitude
would be described:
• rate: high → amplitude: loud;
• rate: low → amplitude: soft.
In Figure 5, we present the sonification mapping space
introduced in Figure 4, applied to Prototype 1. This shows
the data channels, continuous data dimensions and discrete
data dimensions with all possible mappings to sound channels
and sound dimensions.
Figure 5. Data Sound Mappings Space: Prototype 1
To determine the mappings from data to sound for the
prototype, we selected sound channels, continuous sound di-
mensions and discrete sound dimensions from the setsCS, DSα
and DSβ respectively. We have not yet carried out testing of
appropriate mappings for the data dimensions, as described
in Section IV; this is left to future work. Instead, we made
predictions about appropriate mappings at this stage, drawing
on a survey of mappings used in the sonification of physical
quantities in prior sonification work [57]. In that paper, prior
work in which physical quantities are sonified is surveyed, and
it is noted whether data-sound mappings were: assessed as
good; assessed as poor; implemented but not assessed; or not
implemented but mentioned as future work. We applied those
assessed as good for quantities we considered representative
of our data dimensions (for example, for the data dimension
rate, we considered the physical quantities velocity, activity
and event rate from [57]). From this, we derived the following
information, which was then incorporated into the prototype
design.
• Rate. Good mappings described for velocity: pitch,
brightness, tempo, rhythmic duration. Good mappings
described for activity: tempo, rhythmic duration [57].
• Size. Bad mappings described for size: pitch, tempo
[57].
Applied to our sound mappings space, this generated the
following rules.
• rate → pitch, tempo, rhythmic duration
• size NOT → pitch, tempo.
We thus arrived at the following set of relations for the
prototype design.
• Data channels:
◦ Packet → individual tone (cs1 = ψ1(cd1, t))
• Data dimensions (continuous):
◦ Rate → tempo (positive polarity)
(ds11 = γα1(dd11, t))
◦ Destination IP → spatialisation (pan from left
to right headphone) (dsα12 = γα2(ddα12, t))
◦ Source IP → pitch (dsα13 = γα3(ddα13, t))
◦ Destination port → articulation
(dsα14 = γα4(ddα14, t))
◦ Size → amplitude (positive polarity)
(dsα15 = γα5(ddα15, t))
• Data dimensions (discrete):
◦ Protocol → instrument
(dsβ11 = γβ1(ddβ11, t))
◦ Direction → register (dsβ12 = γβ2(ddβ12, t))
Figure 6 shows the prototype design developed from these
relations. In this sonification, each packet observed triggers
an individual note event; these events shown as musical notes
in Figure 6. The above dimension mappings are represented:
the sonification maps data dimensions to the sound dimensions
(including instrument, for example) of each note. The sound
is panned on a continuous scale between left and right,
corresponding to the continuous destination IP dimension. The
rate of traffic at each destination IP is represented by the
tempo of the notes played at that pan location; source IPs
map continuously to frequency such that source IP range is
represented by the range of frequencies played. As shown in
Figure 6, destination ports map to articulation on a continuous
scale. The instrument by which each note is played represents
the protocol in which the packet is transmitted, and the
direction of traffic is conveyed by differentiating between low,
medium and high registers of music.
D. Prototype 2: High-Level Network-Data Sonification for
Monitoring Network-Security Information as a Non-Primary
Task
The aim of Prototype 2 is to enable security analysts to
monitor network data for indicators of attacks as a non-primary
task. The sonification must represent aspects of the network
data that might signal an attack, in a way that is unobtrusive
usually, but draws analysts’ attention to aspects of the data
when required (when a potential attack indicator arises). The
use-case is different to an alert system: the goal here is to
be informative about which data has changed, and how it has
changed.
Our design approach for this use-case is to sonify a subset
of the data through which attacks are indicated – the traffic
rate at the destination IP addresses on the network. The
rationale for this approach is that to be suitable for periph-
eral monitoring, the sonification should be uncomplicated to
understand. We therefore elect not to sonify all indicators
derived in our network-attack characterisation, as in Prototype
1, but to produce a simpler representation of a subset of these
indicators. Our network-attack characterisation showed that
high traffic rates at particular destination IP addresses on the
network were frequently indicators of attacks (see Table VI).
Figure 6. Prototype Diagram: Prototype 1
Monitoring the amount of activity at sensitive machines on the
network such as those on which databases containing sensitive
information are stored is important, and we selected this as
the aim of this peripheral-monitoring sonification prototype.
In the remainder of this section we show how this difference
in approach influences the application of the model and leads
to differing prototype designs.
1) Applying the Sonification Model: We derived the data
channels, data dimensions and data values for the prototype
by considering the data requirement: present the traffic rate at
destination IP addresses on the network. Given the purpose
of the sonification is to be suitable for use in peripheral
monitoring, we aim to present sonified information such that
data changes judged significant (in this case, large increases in
traffic rate at any destination IP represented) draw attention,
and the sonification is otherwise unobtrusive. We let 10 indi-
vidual destination IP addresses be the data channels, and the
packet rate be the data dimension.
For this prototype, the sonification is described by the tuple
〈CDR,DDR,VDR,Relc,Reldα,Reldβ,Relv〉:
• CDR = 〈cdR1〉= 〈Destination IP addresses〉
• DDR = DDα
⌢
R DDβR = 〈ddαR1,ddαR2,
ddαR3〉
⌢〈dβdR1〉= 〈Rate〉
• VDdR = 〈vddR1〉= 〈{low,normal,high}〉
• Relc is described by the functions ψi : R
10 → Rm,
csi = 〈ψi(cd j)| j ∈ {1, ...,n}〉, where n is the number
of network destination IP addresses represented
• Reld and Relv are described by the function
Γ : Rm+1 → Rq, Γi=〈γαi1, ...,γαix,γβi1, ...,γβiy〉
∀i ∈ {1, ...,m}
The notes on the prescription of a “normal” value, and
representations of polarity, following the presentation of the
sonification for Prototype 1, hold for this case also: the
“normal” packet rate for each IP could be prescribed by a
human, set as an average calculated statistically, or calculated
using Machine Learning.
In Figure 7, we present the sonification mapping space
introduced in Figure 4, applied to Prototype 2. This shows
the data channels and continuous data dimensions (there are
no discrete data dimensions in this case) with all possible
mappings to sound channels and sound dimensions.
Figure 7. Data Sound Mappings Space: Prototype 2
As described for Prototype 1, we drew on prior work [57]
to select from the set of sound channels and continuous sound
dimensions. The relations we arrived at are as follows.
• Data channels
◦ 10 destination IP addresses → 10
instrumental lines
(csi = ψi(cdi, t)∀i ∈ {1, ...,10})
• Data dimensions (continuous):
◦ Rate → tempo (positive polarity)
(dsαi1 = γα1(ddαi1, t)∀i ∈ {1, ...,10})
Destination IP 1 →
instrumental line 1
Destination IP 10 →
instrumental line 10
Packet rate at IP → tempo of instrumental line
Figure 8. Prototype Diagram: Prototype 2
Figure 8 shows the prototype design developed from these
relations. In this sonification, the individual instrumental lines
that form the musical piece each present information about an
individual destination IP address on the network (in the figure,
we present an example in which 10 destination IP addresses are
monitored). The lines each follow the base tempo of the musi-
cal piece when the packet rate at the destination IP addresses
they represent is at its “normal” value. When the packet rate at
an individual destination IP address exceeds its “normal” value,
note repetition is introduced in the corresponding instrumental
line, and the speed of note repetition is scaled to convey the
size of the increase in packet rate. As such, a destination IP
with a high traffic rate is represented in the sonification as an
instrumental line with fast note repetition.
E. Implementation of Prototypes
We implemented both prototypes and used them to sonify
the Centre for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA)
“DDoS Attack 2007” dataset [68]. We describe our processes
for, and the challenges that arose during, implementation of
this dataset. The dataset contains a DDoS attack in which a
large flood of incoming traffic is observed, sent from a wide
range of source IP addresses to destination IP addresses on
the network. We reflect on the sounds produced by the two
sonifications of this dataset; in particular, the sounds produced
at the time when the flooding begins compared with the sounds
prior to the flooding.
We implemented the prototypes by reading the dataset in
Python, and parsing the data values according to the mapping
functions presented in Tables VII and VIII. These parsed
values were then rendered as sound using Supercollider (http:
//supercollider.github.io/), a platform for audio programming
and synthesis frequently used in prior sonification work. The
sound rendering was controlled by Open Sound Control (OSC)
messages sent from Python to Supercollider.
Although we have not yet conducted user testing for these
prototypes, our initial assessment from listening to the sonifica-
tions ourselves is that there is a significant change in sound in
both prototypes at the time that the dataset shows flooding from
multiple source IPs. We invite the reader to listen to audio clips
of each of the two network-security monitoring prototypes run-
ning on this dataset (https://soundcloud.com/user-71482294).
We encountered some challenges during the implementa-
tion phase; in the following, we reflect on possible solutions to
these challenges, and hence identify directions for future devel-
opment. The most significant challenge in the implementation
of Prototype 1 arose as a result of the sheer number of packets
logged in the dataset, and the small times between their arrival.
Because of this, it was challenging to implement the channel
relation ψ1 – to render each packet observed as individual
notes without overloading the sound engine, or creating sounds
too complicated to be of use to human listeners.
We sampled randomly every 1 in 10 packets in the
dataset to address this challenge; however, as future work it
is important to investigate the most appropriate methods of
aggregation, sampling and scaling. For example, a solution
might be to aggregate the packets sent in each individual
connection (between the same two IP addresses and ports,
and using the same service) over time intervals (for example,
every 0.1 seconds), and represent the aggregation over this time
interval with a single note, whose amplitude varies depending
on the number of packets aggregated in this time. This would
be a potential way of addressing the problem of packet rates
too fast to sonify, without losing the granularity of information
provided by the representation of each individual packet.
Grond and Berger write that sonification mapping functions
may sometimes be linear, but other forms may be more suitable
depending on the data [56]. Scaling exponentially, or using
methods such as step-change analysis or Fourier Transforms,
are examples of avenues worth exploring. Establishing the
resolution with which we can represent each of the listed
data channels and data dimensions will be a key part of the
development and testing process.
The destination IP representation approach of Prototype 2
may become challenging on large networks. The aim of the
prototype is to represent monitoring information in a relatively
simple fashion suitable for peripheral monitoring. However, the
number of instrumental lines required to represent the many
destination IP addresses on a large organisational network
would likely introduce complexity to the sonification and make
extracting information about individual IP addresses difficult
for the user. It is important to investigate experimentally
how much information we can represent – in this case, how
many destination IP addresses we can represent information
about simultaneously in a way that is useful, and whether
this can match the monitoring requirements of SOCs in large
organisations.
F. Addressing Prior-Art Approaches Using the Sonification
Model
We describe the use of our formalised sonification model in
representing previously-published sonification system designs.
In particular, we verify that our model can address all previous
systems (those in which the sonification design is specified
completely) that use a musical parameter-mapping sonification
method to represent raw network data (these aspects of the sys-
tems are presented in Table II) [29,33,43–45]. Other relevant
systems which use a musical parameter-mapping approach to
represent raw network data are presented in [30, 31, 42], but
the sonification designs for these works are not specified in
enough detail to include.
In Table IX we present the relevant pre-existing soni-
fication systems in terms of the data channels and data
dimensions, and the sound channels and sound dimensions
of our model. In Table X we present the channel relations
and dimension relations for each prior sonification approach
TABLE VII. IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTOTYPE 1
Relation Addressed Description of Implementation Mapping Function
Channel relation: cs1 = ψ1(cd1, t) Individual packets observed are mapped to individual tones The function ψ1 can be described: for the p
th packet cd1p
observed at time t, play a single tone cs1p at time t
Dimension relation:
dsα12 = γα2(ddα12, t)
Destination IP is mapped to spatialisation (pan from left to right headphone).
Here, the possible destination IP addresses take values in the range [0,232], we
converted destination IP addresses to values in this range using a function such
that IP address 0.0.0.0 → 0, and 0.0.0.1 → 1. The pan value varies
continuously in the range [−1,1]
The function γα2 can be described: for a note cs1p played






dsα13 = γα3(ddα13, t)
Source IP is mapped to pitch. Here, the possible source IP addresses take
values in the range [0,232] and the frequencies vary in the chosen range
[261.63,2093]. Frequency 261.63Hz corresponds to C4 – middle C – while
frequency 2093Hz corresponds to C7, three octaves higher. We also use a
hotlisting method: the top 50 source IPs we expect to observe are mapped to
harmonic tones (the notes of a C major 7th chord), while source IPs outside
this hotlist are mapped on a continuous scale to frequencies in the selected
range
For a source IP hotlist tuple Hs, and tuple Mn of musical
notes 〈C,E,G,B〉, the function γα3 can be described: for
note cs1p at time t, and IP conversion function IPVal, the
pitch value is ddα13p ∈ Hs =⇒ dsα13p ∈Mn, ddα13p 6∈





dsα14 = γα4(ddα14, t)
Destination port is mapped to articulation. Here, the possible destination ports
take values in the range [0,216], and the articulation takes values in the range
[0.1,1]. Many packets observed in this dataset did not have destination port
values; in these cases we set the sound articulation value to be 0.5 in
Supercollider.
The function γα4 can be described: for a note cs1p played





dsα15 = γα5(ddα15, t)
Size is mapped to amplitude (positive polarity). Here, for the dataset we
implemented the average packet size was 60 bytes, while occasional packet
sizes were very large. We mapped the size values of the packets to the
amplitude values of the sound using a logarithmic function, in which the
average packet size, 60, mapped to an amplitude value we judged
“comfortable” – the amplitude value 1 in Supercollider.
The function γα5 can be described: for a note cs1p played









dsβ11 = γβ1(ddβ11, t)
Protocol is mapped to instrument. Here, a hotlisting method is used again. The
two protocols most frequently seen in this dataset are mapped onto two
different instruments; the remaining protocols are mapped to another
instrument. For this dataset, the tuple of hotlisted protocols is: Hp = 〈ICMP,
TCP〉, and the tuple of instruments selected was: Mi = 〈strings, saxophone,
piano〉
The function γβ1 can be described: for a note cs1p played
at time t, the instrument value is
ddβ11p ∈ Hp =⇒ dsβ ∈ 〈Mi1,Mi2〉,
ddβ11p 6∈ Hp =⇒ dsβ =Mi3
TABLE VIII. IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTOTYPE 2
Relation Addressed Description of Implementation Mapping Function
Channel relation:
csi = ψi(cdi, t)∀i ∈ {1, ...,10}
Destination IP addresses within a hotlist of 10 addresses Hd = 〈dst1, ...,dst10〉
are mapped to 10 musical lines in the tuple M = 〈m1, ...,m10〉
The function ψi can be described: at any time t, play all
musical lines mi ∈M
Dimension relation: dsα11 =
γα1(ddαi1, t)∀i ∈ {1, ...,10}
Rate is mapped to tempo (positive polarity), scaled such that the average rate
for a particular destination IP is mapped to the base tempo of the music. The
rate is measured by aggregating the number of packets observed at each IP per
second, and comparing this with the average number to derive the tempo for
the corresponding second of music
The function γα1 can be described: for a musical
instrumental line mi ∈M played at time t, where the
average rate for the corresponding destination IP address
dsti is avratei and the base tempo of the music is




TABLE IX. APPLYING THE FORMALISATION TO CAPTURE PREVIOUS MUSICAL PARAMETER-MAPPING SYSTEMS FOR THE SONIFICATION
OF RAW NETWORK DATA: COMPONENTS
Author Data Channels Data Dimensions Sound Channels Sound Dimensions
Qi [43]
Mapping 1:
Traffic queue 16 (cd1) Continuous: byte rate (ddα11); packet rate
(ddα12)






Continuous: byte rate (ddα11); packet rate
(ddα12)
16 groups of piano notes
(cs1, ...,cs16)
Continuous: frequency (dsα11); amplitude
(dsα12)
Brown [44] Network traffic (cd1) Continuous: packet rate (ddα11; number of
TCP handshakes (ddα12); number of HTTP
error messages (ddα13)
Existing musical piece (cs1) Continuous: number of sharp notes
(dsα11); pitch (dsα12); rhythm (dsα13)
Ballora [33] Socket exchanges (cd1);
requests to unusual ports
(cd2); traffic in 5 different
monitoring locations (within
2 subnets; between subnets;
external traffic going to each
subnet) (cd3)
Continuous: source IP (ddα11); destination
IP(ddα12); frequency of packets in ongoing
socket connections (ddα13); traffic rate
(ddα34)
Discrete: port number (ddβ21)
An individual strike of a
gong (cs1); humming sound
(cs2); 5 distinct whooshing
sounds (cs3)
Continuous: rumble’s timbre (dsα11);
sizzle’s timbre (dsα12); stereo pan position
(dsα13); force of strike (dsα14); timbre (of
humming sound) (dsα25); amplitude (of
whooshing sound) (dsα36)
Giot [29] Packets (cd1); useless packets
(e.g. ACK packets) (cd2)
Continuous: packet size (ddα11);
time-to-live (TTL) (ddα12); rate/bandpass
(ddα13); number of useless packets (ddα21)
Discrete: Protocol (ddβ11)
Individual note events
(MIDI) (cs1); noise (cs2)
Continuous: frequency (dsα11); note
duration (dsα12); bandpass of resonant filter
(dsα13); amount of noise (dsα24)
Discrete: sound synthesiser (dsβ11);
Mancuso [45] Individual packets (cd1) Continuous: source IP (ddα11); destination
IP (ddα12)
Discrete: packet size (ddβ11)
String note (cs1); wind note
(cs2)
Continuous: pitch (dsα11, dsα21);
amplitude (dsα12,dsα22)
TABLE X. APPLYING THE FORMALISATION TO CAPTURE PREVIOUS MUSICAL PARAMETER-MAPPING SYSTEMS FOR THE SONIFICATION
OF RAW NETWORK DATA: RELATIONS
Author Channel Relations Dimension Relations
Qi [43]
Mapping 1:
Single traffic queue → all piano notes
(cs1 = ψ(cd1))
Byte rate → frequency (dsα11 = γα1(ddα11, t)); packet rate → amplitude (dsα12 = γα2(ddα12, t))
Qi [43]
Mapping 2:
Traffic queue i → piano notes group i
(csi = ψ(cdi)∀i ∈ {1, ...,16})
Byte rate → frequency (dsαi1 = γα1(ddαi1, t)∀i ∈ {1, ...,16}); packet rate → amplitude
(dsαi2 = γα2(ddαi2, t)∀i ∈ {1, ...,16})
Brown [44] Network traffic → existing musical piece
(cs1 = ψ(cd1))
Traffic rate → number of sharp notes (dsα11 = γα1(ddα11, t)); number of TCP handshakes → pitch
(dsα12 = γα2(ddα12, t)); number of HTTP error messages → rhythm (dsα13 = γα2(ddα13, t))
Ballora [33] Socket exchange → individual strike of gong
(cs1 = ψ(cd1)); request to unusual port →
humming sound; traffic in five different
monitoring locations → five distinct whooshing
sounds
Source IP → gong rumble’s timbre (dsα11 = γα1(ddα11, t)); destination IP → gong sizzle’s timbre
(dsα12 = γα2(ddα12, t)); source IP, destination IP → stereo pan position (dsα13 = γα3(ddα11,ddα12, t));
frequency of packets → force of strike (dsα14 = γα4(ddα13)); port number → timbre of humming sound
(dsα25 = γβ1(ddβ21)); traffic rate → amplitude of whooshing sound (dsα36 = γα4(ddα34))
Giot [29] Packets → individual note events (cs1 = ψ(cd1));
useless packets → noise (cs2 = ψ(cd2))
Packet size → frequency (dsα11 = γα1(ddα11, t); TTL → note duration (dsα12 = γα2(ddα12)); rate →
bandpass of resonant filter (dsα13 = γα3(ddα13)); protocol → sound synthesiser (dsβ11 = γβ1(ddβ11));
number of useless packets → amount of noise (dsα24 = γα4(ddα21))
Mancuso [45] Individual packets → string note, wind note
(cs1 = ψ(cd1), cs2 = ψ(cd1))
Source IP → pitch of string note (dsα11 = γα1(ddα11, t)); destination IP → pitch of wind note
(dsα21 = γα2(ddα12, t)); packet size → amplitude (of string note and wind note) (dsα12 = γβ1(ddβ11)),
(dsα22 = γβ1(ddβ11))
addressed. This shows that the systems addressed can all be
represented in our model, which allows for comparative testing
of newly-developed sonification systems against pre-existing
approaches.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We conclude that there is a growing requirement for the
validation of sonification as a means of improving certain
monitoring capabilities in SOCs. The current state of the art
provides evidence of the potential of sonification in advancing
network-security monitoring capabilities. Systems proposed
and in use have been shown to be as effective as, or more
effective than, other network monitoring techniques insofar as
a limited amount of testing has been performed [19].
As future work, we intend to perform proof-of-concept
experiments for the sonification prototypes. For Prototype 1,
we will sonify a number of network packet capture datasets
containing instances of network attacks using the prototype,
and assess whether “patterns” appear, or deviations from the
“normal” sound of the sonification are heard, at the time of
the attacks. For Prototype 2, we will assess experimentally
whether the sonification conveys the packet rate at individual
destination IP addresses on the network, in a way suitable for
monitoring as a non-primary task.
As described in Section IV, a key stage in the sonifica-
tion development is experimental identification of appropriate
aesthetics: intuitive mappings from data to sound, for exam-
ple. We have applied mappings in both presented prototypes
based on our own intuition, and relevant aspects of prior
work [57]. A direction for future work is conducting design
experiments to determine the optimal mapping aesthetics, and
incorporating these mappings into the formalised sonification
model to generate final system designs. To assess the effec-
tiveness of our sonification model and aesthetic approach, we
need to contrast our approach with pre-existing approaches
to parameter-mapping sonification for network-security moni-
toring [28, 33, 36, 43, 45], by comparing their performance in
highlighting network attacks.
During the presentation of prototypes, we highlighted our
use of a “normal” in describing the values of certain data di-
mensions. A challenge in the implementation of the prototypes
lies in determining appropriate meanings of this “normal”,
which is left as an abstraction in the model. The normal might
in practice be defined, or calculated using Statistics or Machine
Learning for a particular network. The normal could also be
defined not by the system itself, but discerned by the humans
using the system, based on what they expect to be, or have
become accustomed to, hearing. The former approach is likely
to be more appropriate for enabling the peripheral monitoring
capability targeted in Use-Case 2, while the latter (in which
humans learn to “hear” some normal) may apply to Use-Case
1, given the aim to enable humans to detect anomalies.
Alternative methods of extracting the data requirements for
network-attack detection should be explored. The attack char-
acterisation approach taken here could be extended, and vali-
dated, through security analysts’ input on their real network-
data monitoring requirements. This should explore both how
analysts detect anomalies indicating attacks through network
data, and which aspects of network data they may realistically
be required to monitor as a non-primary task (for addressing
Use-Case 2 in particular).
Also left to future work is the exploration of the potential
interactions between sonification and visualisation, and of
how multimodal system designs can be leveraged for the
context. In Prototype 1, for example, we envisage that, while
sonification is used here for the perception of anomalous events
on the network – the recognition by humans that “something
is wrong” – visualisation could complement the system by
enabling comprehension of the nature of the events perceived,
directed by the sonification. Similarly, Prototype 2 could be
complemented by a visualisation that conveys exactly which
destination IP address has experienced an increase in packet
rate, following the event that the listening analyst’s attention
is drawn to some change in the sonification.
Further work should be carried out, as highlighted in
Section IV, in user testing of the system, in order to assess
whether users (in particular, the intended users: security an-
alysts) can hear the patterns generated in the sonification at
the time of the attacks. We intend to research the potential
for sonification to match, or improve on, the performance of
existing monitoring systems in the SOC environment such as
security visualisations and IDSs. At this stage, usability aspects
such as integration of sonification into the SOC environment
should also be addressed.
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